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ARGUMENT
A.

OPENING BRIEF COULD NOT PROVIDE WHAT DID NOT EXIST.
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In Appellee's reply, cited case law and statute is flawed application, and
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did not support any basis in the record for the district court's decision, vis-a'-vis,
Rule 24(a)(5)(B) Utah Rules of App. °
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As demonstrate^

occupies significant lengths of the short record without shedding any light on how
it was derived from the evidence (Op. Br. pg. 2 pg.13-16; Rec<
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beyond that submitted in opening brief (Op. Br. pg. 2; pg. 8 at para 3, pg. 9: para
2&3,
3.
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In fact, Appellee's rrp

offers its own misconstrued derivative of the trial

evident, i • I< 11 u»il • . 11, \p an uns

' ' i litany as attributable basis for the trial

court's ruling. Despite preponderance of case law cited by Appellee, nuilhoi
Appellant or Appellee could have or did, provided what is not thorp I P| > pi i fi 1
para. 3 & pg. 32 para. 1).

B.

APPELLEE'S DISTORTIONS OF OPENING BRIEF ARE DISINGENUOUS

4.

Examples of reply's selective-error-filled renditions are lengthy and

patently erroneous including that opening brief was Appellant arguing that he "was
in an emergency situation and should be allowed to violate traffic laws" (Rp. pg.
10: para. 5). Neither has Appellant (nor as a Defendant at trial) made any such
arguments (Op. Br. pgs. 15-16). Stewart called 911 sometime upon entering the
southbound 1-15 freeway, after being injured at a remote construction sight
location that was difficult to find even for experienced sub-contractors who had
directions (Op. Br. pgs. 3-4: para. 1-2). By that time he elected to proceed to a
location with which he was familiar in Bountiful City, also declining ambulance
service, which did not impact Stewart's following traffic laws and driving prudently
to get to emergency care (ibid also Op. Br. pgs. 7-8 1st para.). Whether Stewart
was prudent in deciding his welfare rested on himself rather than waiting for
ideally deployed ambulance care to arrive is not at issue (Op. Br. pg. 3 para 2).
5.

What Appellee does not venture with replay is any basis in fact for the

trial court ignoring the evidence (including its own finding) that Stewart was
proceeding at all times with "heavy rush hour traffic" (Op. Br. pg. 11 para. 16; pg.
12 para. 17). Exceptionally this is shown in opening brief for the relevant point
along 1000 to 1100 East where 500 South street narrows from two lanes to one
lane and traffic flow though concomitant signals would have no prospect to have
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exceeded the speed limit (ibid). Further, it is unquestioned and only lightly
acknowledged in Appellee's replay, that Stewart's truck attracted Officer Bell's
attention for no other reason than its emergency lights were activated. She did not
have her radar gun activated and could not have selected Stewart's or any vehicle
from heavy enfilade traffic flow (Rp. pg. 5: para. 3; pg. 10-11: 1st para; Op.Br. pg.
11 para. 14; pg. 8: 2nd para).
6.

There is no contradiction that Stewart did appropriately stop for Bell at the

1100 East 500 South intersection and for which Bell admitted that she "[I] was not
pursuing your vehicle" (Rd. pg. 10: 6; Op.Rp. 12: para 18). At best the trial court
ignored its own rather significant experience and finding that 500 South "had
heavy traffic" at such times of the day (and evidently did not find Bell credible that
there was not any traffic). It is not plausible finding for Stewart to be speeding
where this road junctions to one lane and all traffic comes to nearly a stand still
going through traffic lights (Op. Br. pg. 4-5 para. 4). The trial officer's ruling for
failure to stop is not supportable by the record and contradict Bell's admission that
she was not pursuing Stewart (Op. Br. pg. 5: para 7).
7.

To suggest Stewart was evading after having stopped at 1100 East

intersection to inform Bell of his serious injury and intentions to proceed to the
Lake View Emergency, is blatantly false argument (Op. Br. pg. 9 2nd para.). This is
depicted from Bell's actions in deactivating her pursuit lights upon calling Bountiful
communications for the first time, and conclusively a showing she was not
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thereafter in pursuit of Stewart (Rp. pg. 22 1st para; Op.Br. pg. 13 para. 19).
Whether trial court is accustomed to a conspicuous disregard for the evidence
should not be excused by an appeal to demeanor findings here by Appellee (Rp.
pg. 17 2nd para).
8.

If anything, as stated in opening brief, the trial was rife with judicial

over-reaching and abuses which among others, the hearing officer subjecting the
Defendant (Appellant) to leading, often verbose and loaded questioning. Several
such instances are evident at trial where the Defendant was confronted with
ameliorating his answers to avoid entrapment (Op. Br. pg. 13 at para 20, also
Record 54:16-25; 55).

C.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DEMEANOR FINDINGS, IF ANY, ARE
UNDERMINED AND DEFIED BY THE RECORD

9.

Appellee wishes to bolster its arguments for dismissal on technical

grounds by suggesting the hearing officer somehow made adverse credibility
findings to the Defendant that effectively erases overpowering evidence (Rp. 23
3rd para). In fact, if the hearing officer ever made such demeanor finding it would
be in defiance of the record, but is not anywhere supportable that he did. The
contrary is shown in any evidence that differed from that presented at trial by
Stewart, such as Bell's recollections and dissembling testimony including: memory
regarding advice of superiors Creil and Gilbert to "let this matter drop;" whether
-4-

hospital staff advised her she could not enter emergency treatment room for
Stewart, regarding traffic flow relevant to "rush hour" conditions for which even the
hearing officer evidently was aware from his own experiences (Op. Br. 8: para
3;12: 17; 12-13: para. 18; Rd: 57: 17-18; 62:19-21; 23-25; 63: 1-2), whether
informed at the traffic stop of Stewart's injury (Op.Br. pg. 5 para. 7; pg. 6 para. 8),
and others.
10.

Appellant will agree the hearing officer attempted to attribute Stewart with

having "an attitude;" but this is not substantiated at any place in the evidence. The
opposite was true of Stewart's actions and against a convoluted mind set to
suggesting that he was somehow responsible for Bell's behavior. His statement
that Bell could not be expected "to be perfect" while castigating Stewart for
moving with traffic to get to the hospital for medical attention is culpable (Rd. 63:
17-20). Nothing exists to support that Stewart was not in compliance of even Bell's
egregious order for a blood-soaked Stewart to re-park his truck before being
allowed to enter the hospital for emergency treatment of a severe wound (Op. Br.
13-14: para. 20-21; Rd. 63:14-20). Bell admitted prima fascia that she was "not
pursuing Stewart" (Op.Br. pg. 6: para. 7); that within one block of encountering
Stewart she did not have her radar gun turned on. (Op.Br. pg. 5 para. 5). One
block later, where Stewart had stopped and informed Bell of injury and intentions
to proceed to hospital, Bell made her first call to Bountiful Communications and
turned off her pursuit lights (Op.Br. pg. 6). During testimony, Bell denied any
-5-

knowledge of superiors and hospital staff attempts at lending the situation with
reasonable judgement. Instead of proving assistance in an emergency, Bell
presented herself as an impediment to the situation. These are glaring errors that
show a dilemma for the hearing office to arrive at where he did. Such should not
lend itself even for "traffic court" and should be dealt with according to the equities.
CONCLUSIONS
Appellee's treatment of the nexus of the case is out of context excerpts. Such are
misleading both going to evidentiary or even demeanor findings adverse to
Appellant. Even Bell's own testimony shows otherwise. Appellee's reply is
characterized by the deceptive postulate that Stewart thought "he was in an
emergency situation and should be allowed to violate traffic laws." Appellee's reply
is fife with half truths and outright false statements. Therefore, Appellee's reply
should be compared with opening brief, and the record side by side to determine
the context of actual circumstances. One example, is suggesting that somehow
Bell activating her emergency lights (if she did) while traveling in the opposite
direction, would be known to Stewart and/or the line up of rush hour traffic going in
a direction opposed to that of Bell. Or for that matter, that they would have had
room to pull off the road in such traffic? This all materialized within one block of
where Bell first noticed Stewart at 1000 East and he turned around at 1100 East
intersection? The fact that Bell did not arrive to the 1100 East intersection to even
know that Stewart had stopped there to ask directions speaks how this evolved
-6-

(Op. Br. pg. 11 para. 14). Without making verbatim quotations, Appellant's opening
brief did fairly represent the trial court's decision making for what it was, an
unbecoming denunciation, not supportable by the evidence or even by the trial
officer's own experience and finding for 500 South traffic conditions (at 7:00 p.m
summer rush hour conditions). The record and opening brief poise substantial
factual basis for what should have been reasoned decision making by the district
court. Appellee here suggests technical basis and a contrived reading of the record
to support dismissal without consideration of the equities. Certainly, Appellant is
not asking a de novo review, as suggested by Appellee, but that at some point
(herein) the equities be determinative. These unabashed characterizations are out
of context for opening brief. This is thin tissue Appellee suggests for salvaging a
suspect and conclusively flawed trial. It should be taken for what it is worth and this
matter reversed in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

Walter Noel Stewart, Pro Se
4730 Mile High Drive
Provo, Utah 84604
(801)787-2363
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Walter Noel Stewart, filing Pro Se state that on this November 3rd, 2006, the
foregoing "REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT" was hand delivered to the Court of
Appeals and sent by regular U.S.A. mail to:
John C. Ynchausti
790 South 100 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Walter Noel Stewart
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